Czech Republic – President Zeman under fire

This post first appeared on presidential-power.com on 19 December 2014

Since coming into office, president Miloš Zeman has not shied away from controversy. He made headlines early on in his presidency when he appointed the Rusnok government despite an evident lack of support in parliament and a parliamentary counter-proposal. While this had only little impact on his public standing so far, he recently had to face increasing criticism for his statements and behaviour in office, and experienced a dramatic drop in public approval.

Protesters show president Zeman symbolic red cards during the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution | photo via wikimedia commons

Since Vaclav Havel, Czech presidents have given live radio Interviews from their residence in Lany. On these occasions they discussed current political developments and used the opportunity to highlight issues close to their heart. During an interview in early November, Zeman was asked about the Russian dissident punk group ‘Pussy Riot’ while talking about the policies of Vladimir Putin. Yet rather than discussing the latter, Zeman provided Czech translations of the band’s name and a number of their songs using a wide range of profanities. Following the interview, the radio station not only received hundreds of complaints but Zeman’s words were also strongly criticised by politicians across the political spectrum as being inappropriate for a head of state. While Zeman and a number of other prominent Czech politicians have been known to use a more ‘colourful’ language at times, the incident is so far unique.

Following the incident, Zeman and his statements came under closer scrutiny by media and the public, leading to further dissatisfaction and criticism. During his trip to China only a few days prior to the controversial interview, Zeman had declared that he believed Taiwan to be part of China (which contradicts the government’s stance) and said on Chinese TV that he had ‘come to learn how to stabilise society’. Furthermore, he returned from his trip using the private jet of a Czech businessman rather than an official aircraft. While the latter might not seem too controversial for the outsider, the fact that the Czech Republic has long battled with political corruption and flights sponsored by businessmen also played a (admittedly less important) role in the resignation of German president Christian Wulff due to corruption allegations highlights that this was more than just a ‘faux pas’ (which Zeman – as a former Prime Minister – should have known to avoid).

Another part of the public discussion of Zeman’s behaviour was (and still is) his stance on the Ukrainian crisis. Among others, Zeman appeared on Russian TV to criticise the EU sanctions, proposed the ‘Finlandization’ of Ukraine (subordination of foreign & defence policy to Russia),invited Russian president Vladimir Putin to Prague, and spoke up against the prospect of Ukrainian NATO membership. While the latter is also the German position, Zeman’s attitude is not shared by the generally very Russo-sceptic Czech population. It is therefore no surprise that protests against Zeman erupted at celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the ‘Velvet Revolution’. During his speech, he was greeted by a chorus of whistles and booing, and protesters threw eggs at him (one of which hit German president Joachim Gauck who was there as an honorary guest). During a recent trip to Southern Moravia, Zeman was similarly greeted by protesters.

trust in Zeman

According to a recent recent poll by CVVM trust in the president has been falling sharply and to the lowest level since Zeman took office (with his previous low occurring after the 2013 parliamentary elections). Furthermore, the poll was conducted during mid-November and does not take into account the subsequent events and protests. Analysts therefore expect a further drop in the next poll which is being conducted at the moment. The government of Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka (with which Zeman is in cohabitation) benefits from the protests to some degree. Nevertheless, the fact he openly contradicts government policy has become a problem and threatens the government’s credibility abroad. Prime Minister Bohuslav Sobotka has therefore asked Zeman to coordinate his speeches with the government (in this context see also my recent post about presidential speeches Germany). It is unlikely that Zeman will bow to the government’s pressure in this regard. Nevertheless, once the end of his term comes closer (he still has more than three years in office left), he might have to change his behaviour to please his voters and be elected for second term.

Who’s in charge when the president is gone? Acting presidents in European republics

This post first appeared on presidential-power.com on 27 June 2014

The premature termination of a presidential term – be it by impeachment, resignation or death of the incumbent – is generally a rare phenomenon so that the respective regulations belong the constitutional provisions that are applied least often in political practice. Nevertheless, in recent years a number of European republics had to activate these stipulations, often for the first time. This post compares the regulations on acting presidents in European republics and discusses the consequences for the separation of powers and potential for conflict.

Acting German Federal President, Speaker of the Federal Council and Minister-President of Bavaria Horst Seehofer in 2012 | © German Presidential Office

The resignations of German Federal Presidents Horst Köhler in 2010 and Christian Wulff in 2012 presented the first instances in which speakers of the Bundesrat had to take over presidential duties. Similarly, the tragic death of Polish President Lech Kaczyński in 2010 was the first event in post-1989 Poland that required the Sejm Marshal (speaker of the lower house) to temporarily fulfil the role of president. In Romania, the two impeachment attempts against president Traian Basescu in 2007 and 2012 also meant that the speaker of the Senate acted as president while the population was consulted in referenda. On the other hand, when Slovak president Schuster needed to receive specialist treatment in an Austrian hospital in 2000, the speaker of parliament and Prime Minister fulfilled his duties in tandem.

The above examples show that European republics show a great variation in who becomes acting president. In fact, Bulgaria and Switzerland are the only European republics with a functioning vice-presidency (although due to the collegial nature of the Swiss executive its position/relevance differs significantly) [1] and In the remaining countries it is not always obvious who takes over presidential duties in the case of presidential impeachment, resignation or death. The default option is to temporarily devolve the function to a representative of parliament (in all but Bulgaria, Finland and Switzerland representatives of parliament are involved), yet even here differences exist that have consequences for the division of power.

In France, Germany, Italy and Romania the speaker of the second chamber of parliament. As – except for Italy – the government is not responsible to the second chamber this arrangement guarantees a mutual independence of acting president and other institutions. Even though Austria and Poland also have bicameral system, presidential duties here are performed by the speakers of the first chamber and thus by politicians that are more prominent in everyday politics and usually belong to the governing party. In Austria this is partly mitigated by the fact that the speaker and the two deputy speakers perform this role together, yet in Poland the stipulation proved to be controversial – not only because the generally more political role of the Polish Sejm Marshal but also because of the fact that acting president Komorowski was the government’s candidate in the presidential elections. In the Czech Republic, likewise a bicameral system, presidential duties are also fulfilled by the speaker of the first chamber, yet in cooperation with the Prime Minister.

 

Countries with unicameral systems cannot generally choose a more independent political candidate, yet as the examples of Iceland and Ireland show it is still possible to create less political alternative by pairing them (among others) with the Chairman of the Supreme Court in multi-member committees that jointly fulfil the position of acting president. Estonia shows another way of ensuring independence of the speaker of parliament as acting president in a unicameral system. The constitution foresees that speaker of parliament temporarily gives up their function to act as president and a new speaker is elected for that period to maintain a clear separation of powers.[2] Last, only Finland and Malta place the role of acting president in the hands of the Prime Minister which is even more exceptional when considering the great differences between the two political systems.

The comparison above has shown that variations in who becomes acting president do not vary according to the mode of presidential election or presidential powers and their origin often predate the current political system. An example for this are the regulations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia which both based their regulations on constitutional drafts that still were still designed for the countries’ functioning within a federal Czechoslovakia. Once the break-up was agreed and quick adoption of new constitutions was needed, the presidency was merely added and the actors that previously represented the republic at federation level became the designated acting presidents (Slovakia only introduced a co-role for the speaker of parliament in 1998 as it turned out that the constitution did not transfer enough power to the Prime Minister as acting president to maintain a functioning state after parliament failed to elect a new president).

The question of who is in charge when the president is gone might appear relatively insignificant at first glance given the rarity of early terminations of presidential terms or long-term absence of presidents during their term. Nevertheless, the different stipulations strongly affect the degree to which the presidency can or is likely to still fulfil its function as check-and-balance on other institutions while it is vacant. While this becomes more relevant the longer there is a vacancy in the presidential office, it still changes the balance of power within a political system already in the short term and therefore merits attention. For instance, during the one month that Slovak president Rudolf Schuster spent in hospital in Austria in 2000, Prime Minister Dzurinda and National Council speaker used their position as acting presidents to veto three bills to which Schuster had previously declared his opposition. Only shortly afterwards, the government majority passed the bills again and thus made sure that Schuster could no longer veto the bills or request a review before the constitutional court.

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[1] The Cypriot constitution also institutes a vice-presidency which is reserved for a Turkish Cypriot while the post of president is to be held by a Greek Cypriot. Initially a Turkish Cypriot vice-president served alongside a Greek Cypriot president, yet the vice-presidency has been vacant for about 50-40 years. The start date of the vacancy is difficult to establish – while Turkish Cypriots have not participated in government or parliament since the 1963 crisis, the title of vice-president appears to have been used by Turkish Cypriot leaders until the coup d’état in 1974.
[2] Estonian members of government are also required to give up their place in parliament upon appointment and another MP enters parliament in their place for the time of their appointment.

Europe as a springboard for the presidency? The experience of presidents and presidential candidates in EU institutions

This post first appeared on presidential-power.com on 4 June 2014

On 25 May 2014, former EU Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaitė won the election for her second term as president of Lithuania. The fact that candidates with experience in EU institutions run for president is not uncommon and a position in the EU institutions should bring a number of advantages for candidates. As a number of former MEPs and Commissioners have been elected president, this raises the question to what extent the European institutions present a ‘springboard’ for the presidency. To answer this question, this post looks at the ‘EU experience’ of presidential candidates and presidents in the EU member states. While (former) MEPs and Commissioners have run for president in 20 out of 27 countries, only few are able to gather a significant number of votes. Also, despite the fact that some European presidents once held a European office, this was rarely the reason for their electoral success. Nevertheless, EU experience does also not hinder success in presidential elections. Rather, candidates with EU experience are often those who would have little chances of success in any case.

Lithuanian President and former EU Commissioner Dalia Grybauskaitė in the European Parliament| photo via eu2013.lt

A political position in the European institutions should have a number of advantages for prospective presidential candidates in both parliamentary and semi-presidential systems. The ‘European experience’ helps candidates to stress their ability to represent their country abroad. They are also less likely to be drawn into fights within their national parties and can thus stay relatively uncontroversial and develop a suprapartisan image that is untainted by national scandals. As they are rarely at the centre of media attention, European candidates might thus be able to maintain a certain ‘outsider’ bonus even if they are part of their party’s leadership.

When Dalia Grybauskaitė was first elected president of Lithuania in 2009, her work as Commissioner for Financial Programming and Budget, particularly her efforts to reduce spending on various agricultural programmes brought her much praise (she was even named ‘Commissioner of the Year 2005’). By openly criticising the Lithuanian government’s failure to respond to the financial crisis she made sure that she became a household name on the political scene of her home country and paved the way for her first-round victory (winning 68%) in the 2009 presidential elections. Her European experience mattered for her initial election. Nevertheless, this story of Europe as a ‘springboard’ for the presidency appears to be rather unique and not the norm in the EU member states.

Already in 2014, Grybauskaitė’s European background – just as the fact that her main opponent Zigmantas Balčytis served as an MEP since 2009 – played no significant role. The table below summarises the number of presidential elections and presidents (total & those with EU experience) as well as the average number of candidates (total & those with EU experience) for presidential elections held in EU member states since 1979. Out of the 484 candidates that ran for presidents in 69 different elections, only 38 (7.8%) could boast with experience in the European institutions. Nevertheless, 6 out of 52 presidents during this period had a European background, i.e. 11.5% and thus a slightly higher proportion. Nevertheless, EU experience only played a role for Lithuanian president and former EU commissioner Dalia Grybauskaite.

In case of the other presidents other factors were more important than their experience in EU institutions. In Estonia, president Toomas Hendrik Ilves had served as Foreign Minister for several years and had been a member of the Social Democratic Party’s leadership before being elected to the European parliament in 2004. At his election in 2006, Ilves’ international experience and recognition gained while in government generally played a greater role for his election than his two years as a MEP. In Hungary, president Pal Schmitt had been a MEP and vice-president of the European Parliament since 2004 before he was elected president in 2010. However, Schmitt’s loyalty to Prime Minister and party leader Viktor Orban and promise not to obstruct the government’s controversial reform agenda was more important for his election. Furthermore, the international experience that Schmitt gained as an ambassador and functionary of the Olympic Committee would have been more salient qualifications than his four years in Strasbourg and Brussels. Slovene president Borut Pahor served as MEP between 2004 and 2008. Nevertheless, Pahor’s following term as Prime Minister during 2008-2012 and previous role as speaker of the Slovene parliament (2000-2004) certainly trumped any influence of his EU experience. Last, French presidents Chirac (1005-2007) and Sarkozy (2007-2012) can claim some,  yet for the course of their further political career and presidency relatively insignificant EU experience. In 1979 Chirac was elected to the newly created European Parliament but gave up his mandate in 1980 in favour of his seat in the French National Assembly. Nicolas Sarkozy was elected as an MEP in 1999 but also resigned to keep his seat in the National Assembly.

Country Number of presidential elections Average number of candidates/
average number of candidates with EU experience
Total number of presidents/
presidents with EU experience
Austria 3 3.3 / n/a 2 / 0
Bulgaria 2 12.5 / 1 2 / 0
Cyprus 2 10 / 1 2 / 0
Czech Republic 2 5.5 / 1 2 / 0
Estonia 2 2.5 / 1.5 1 / 1
Finland 3 7.67 / 1.67 2 / 0
France 6 10 / 4.5 4 / 2
Germany 8 3 / n/a 6 / n/a
Greece 6 ? / n/a 4 / n/a
Hungary 3 1.67 / 0.3 3 / 1
Ireland 5 4.4 / 0.6 4 / 0
Italy 5 18 / 0.2 4 / 0
Latvia 2 3.5 / n/a 2 / n/a
Lithuania 3 6.33 / 1 2 / 1
Malta 2 1 / n/a 2 / n/a
Poland 2 11 / n/a 2 / n/a
Portugal 6 5 / 0.17 3 / 0
Romania 2 12 / 0.5 1 / 0
Slovakia 3 11 / n/a 2 / n/a
Slovenia 2 5 / 1.5 2 / 1
Total 69 7.02 / 0.55 52 / 6
Note: All calculations begin with the first presidential election since the country’s EU accession or  the first presidential election after 1979 (marking the first direct election of the European Parliament).

Regardless of how brief their European experience is, former or current MEPs run far more often for presidential office than (former) members of the Commission – the latter group only consists of three candidates: Meglena Kuneva (Bulgaria; 2011: 14%), Raymond Barre (France; 1988; 17%) and Dalia Grybauskaite (Lithuania; 2009: 68%; 2014: 46% / 58%). Hereby, MEPs running for president are typically leaders of smaller parties that do not generally have any chance at winning the presidential election (or even proceed into the second round of voting). An example of the former is Valdemar Tomaševski, chairman of the Polish Electoral Alliance in Lithuania who won only 4.7% of the vote in 2009 and 8.36% in 2014.

Europe does thus not generally represent a springboard for the presidency although the case of Dalia Grybauskaite shows that it can be beneficial.  Yet even in her case national political experience (Grybauskaite served as minister of finance 2001-2004) played at least a minor role and is thus overall more important than time served as the representative of European institutions.

Czech Republic – A new government and the evolution of semi-presidentialism

This post first appeared on presidential-power.com on 7 February 2014

On 29 January 2014, 95 days since the parliamentary elections of October 2013, president Miloš Zeman appointed a new government under the leadership of Czech Social Democrat Chairman Bohuslav Sobotka, thus ending the longest tenure of an acting government in recent Czech history. While the government still has to pass a vote of confidence in the assembly until the end of February, this is rather seen as a formality given the coalition’s 111 votes in the 200 seat assembly – a comparatively comfortable majority for Czech conditions.

President Zeman eventually did not refuse to appoint any of the candidates presented to him by the coalition parties, yet the past months were filled with speculations about the president’s potential interference. These were mainly fueled by the fact that Zeman had in an unprecedented move already appointed the last government of Jiri Rusnok without consulting parties (the government subsequently failed to win a vote of confidence and resigned) as well as Zeman’s insistence that he need not appoint all candidates proposed to him. In particular, Zeman objected to the candidates for the ministries of interior, industry/trade, and human rights/legislative council. While his objections to individual candidates were only made public in early January, Zeman previously announced that he would require lustration certificates from each candidate (mainly aimed at preventing ANO 2011 leader Andrej Babiš from taking office) and that he would not appoint a candidate without relevant experience.

The question is now in how far this activism can be attributed to Zeman’s popular mandate (from 1993-2013 Czech presidents were elected by parliament) and why he eventually chose to acquiesce with the prime minister’s wishes. Many commentators have pointed out the importance of direct presidential elections for explaining the president’s activism (particularly in connection with the appointment of the Rusnok government in summer 2013) but Zeman himself has not yest publicly spoken about the increased popular legitimacy of the presidency. Given that he has been in office for less than a year (as well as the personal dislike/feud between former party colleagues Sobotka and Zeman), a definite answer on this question needs to wait. Nevertheless, the fact that Zeman has voiced his intention to interfere so publicly suggests that he is very conscious of the signals that he has to send to his electorate.

A clearer answer can be given to the question of why Zeman eventually accepted all candidates for government office, First, Sobotka has already announced that the coalition was intending to limit the president’s powers – by refraining from interference Zeman now avoids a quick implementation or (in case the coalition cannot mobilise a constitutional majority) clarification of his only vaguely defined powers by the constitutional court (which would likely rule in favour of government and parliament).

Even if Zeman continues his current level of activity, this does not mean that the system will necessarily evolve in a way that gives the president a more prominent decision. After neighbouring Slovakia introduced popular presidential elections in 1999, its first incumbent Rudolf Schuster also showed a significantly increased level of activism. Yet faced with a determined parliament and government, he (and his successor) eventually failed to change the (parliamentary) logic of Slovak politics.

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Composition of Sobotka I

government party seat share and portfolio allocation_sobotka1

In terms of portfolio allocation, ANO 2011 is slightly underrepresented but as a new party likely has had to pay an apprentice’s premium. Nevertheless, it receives the offices of first deputy PM, finance (both for controversial party leader Andrej Babiš), and justice.

Prime Minister: Bohuslav Sobotka (ČSSD, male, 42)
First Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Finance: Andrej Babiš (ANO 2011, male, 59)
Deputy Prime Minister & Minister of Science + Research: Pavel Bělobrádek (KDU-ČSL, male, 37)
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Lubomír Zaorálek (ČSSD, male, 57)
Minister of Interior Milan Chovanec (ČSSD, male, 44)
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs: Michaela Marksová-Tominová (ČSSD, female, 44)
Minister of Industry and Trade: Jan Mládek (ČSSD, male, 53)
Minister of Health: Svatopluk Němeček (ČSSD, male, 41)
Minister of Justice: Helena Válková (non-partisan/ANO 2011, female, 63)
Minister of Education, Youth and Sport: Marcel Chládek (ČSSD, male, 45)
Minister of Defence: Martin Stropnický (ANO 2011, male, 57)
Minister of Transport: Antonín Prachař (ANO 2011, male, 51)
Minister for Regional Development: Věra Jourová (ANO 2011, female, 49)
Minister of the Environment: Richard Brabec (ANO 2011, male, 47)
Minister of Agriculture: Marian Jurečka (KDU-ČSL, male, 32)
Minister of Culture: Daniel Herman (KDU-ČSL, male, 50)
Minister for Human Rights and Equal Opportunities: Jiří Dienstbier Jr. (ČSSD, male, 44)

Kiss of death? – The failure of president-endorsed parties in Central and Eastern Europe

This post first appeared on presidential-power.com on 6 November 2013

In a recent article in the Prague Post titled ‘Presidents give parties “kiss of death”’ Daniel Bardsley draws attention to the fact that parties backed by former or current Czech presidents failed to succeed in parliamentary elections (president Zeman’s ‘Party of Citizens’ Rights – the Zemanites (SPOZ)’ only received 1.51% and the ‘Heads up’ party backed by former president Václav Klaus 0.41%). Motivated by the subsequent discussion between Seán Hanley, Robert Elgie and me on Twitter (click here to read) this post looks at the success and failure of parties affiliated with current and former presidents in Central and Eastern Europe.

This post will be the first post in an irregular series in which the contributors to this blog explore the relationship between presidents and their parties.

A seemingly common phenomenon
At first glance, the failure of parties affiliated with former or current presidents to gain significant electoral support appears to be a common phenomenon across Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. In addition to the Czech Republic (where one might additionally refer to Václav Havel’s half-hearted and subsequently unsuccessful backing of the Green Party), there are several other cases. In neighbouring Slovakia, the newly-formed ‘Party for Citizens’ Understanding’ (SOP) led by Rudolf Schuster won 8% in the 1998 elected, entered the government and saw its chairman elected president in the country’s first popular presidential elections. However, already four years later the party did not run again and dissolved a year later. The ‘Movement for Democracy’ (HZD) of Schuster’s successor, Ivan Gašparovič, fared even worse. Founded in 2002, the party never gained parliamentary representation, yet was surprisingly able to have its chairman elected president. While Gašparovič’s re-election campaign in 2009 was successful (not the least thanks to the support from the parties of the government coalition), HZD did not run again in the 2010 and 2012 parliamentary elections and recommended to vote for SMER-SD instead. In Poland, the ‘Non-partisan bloc for Support of Reforms’ (BBWR) founded to create a parliamentary representation for president Lech Wałęsa gained only 5.41% in the 1993 elections and received barely more than 1% of votes in 1997 (admittedly, Wałęsa’s presidency had ended in 1995 and he had no involvement in the subsequent campaigns). Further north in Latvia, there is another example of a failed president endorsed-party. Having served as president from 1993 to 1997, Guntis Ulmanis returned to politics in 2010 as chairman of the party alliance ‘For a Good Latvia’. The alliance won only 8% seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections and dissolved before the 2011 snap elections. One of the constituent parties ran again yet failed to win any seats.

Common problems?
Concluding that presidents are the key factor in causing a party’s demise based on the examples above would certainly not be a good idea. We have not yet looked at the successful examples of president-endorsed parties (more on these below) – or for parties not endorsed by presidents for that matter – and there is thus no variation on independent and dependent variables. But already a closer look at the mentioned cases shows that presidential endorsement is hardly the reason for the parties’ lack of success. In the case of the recent Czech parliamentary elections, the failure of SPOZ and ‘Heads up’ to succeed was interesting but – given previous opinion polls – not too surprising. Even though in existence since 2006 and having run under different names, ‘Heads up’ had never been a successful party (in fact, they failed to win seats in all national and European elections in which they participated). In addition, opinion polls never suggested that there was a chance for the party to succeed and reported it under the ‘other’ column. SPOZ on the other hand had had a greater chance of entering parliament (polls still showed it at 7.2% in August 2013) but only had a very limited policy programme (its most important point – the introduction of popular elections – had already been realised in 2012/2013). Similarly in Latvia, Guntis Ulmanis’ ‘For a good Latvia’ consisted of parties that already did not fare well in public opinion so that the meagre result in the 2010 elections and the subsequent failure to gain representation in 2011 (at this point Ulmanis had also already declared that he would not run for parliament again) was no surprise.

In the case of Lech Wałęsa’s BBWR, Schuster’s SOP and Gašparovič’s HZD, the reason for the party’s success seems to be rather neglect than outright endorsement. In Poland, the BBWR had been founded without formal involvement of Wałęsa and – in a very Wałęsa-typical whim – he retracted his official endorsement shortly before the elections (nevertheless, he managed to install two of its representatives in government). Gašparovič and  Schuster both quickly distanced themselves from their parties after their election as president. While Gašparovič remained at least formally faithful to the HZD while building new connections with SMER and a few other parties, Schuster almost immediately abandoned the SOP so that president-government relations from only two years after his election onwards can be described as cohabitational.

Success stories
It appears that the main problem for parties affiliated with presidents is thus that presidents chose to support (or continued to support) parties whose chances were – for whatever reason – already slim or  withdrew their support before the (next) electoral contest. To stay in the ‘kiss of death metaphor’, presidents chose to kiss a party that was already dead or made their exit before it died.

Nevertheless, there are also success stories of parties endorsed by former presidents. In Lithuania, the ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ founded in 2002 by former prime minister Rolandas Paksas not only managed to get Paksas elected president in 2004 but has also since been represented in parliament with a moderate contingent of deputies (2004-2008: 11 seats, 2008-2012: 15 seats, 2012-present: 11 seats) and is currently part of the governing coalition. In Latvia, the ‘Reform Party’ (initially ‘Zatler’s Reform Party’) of former president Valdis Zattlers (2007-2011) won 22 seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections making it the second largest party in the legislature (it has since lost 6 deputies and is only the third largest party group). It also participates in the government coalition.

Nevertheless, both cases also share a similarity that makes the drawing of definite conclusions difficult: by a significant share of voters both Paksas and Zatlers are likely seen as having been unrightfully removed from office. In the case of Paksas – who was impeached in 2004 – this is relatively self-explanatory as the constitutional court later ruled that his removal from office was unconstitutional. Zatlers on the other hand was simply not re-elected for a second term by parliament. Nevertheless, the main reason behind this was that Zatlers had initiated a referendum on the dissolution of parliament after the parliamentary majority refused to lift the immunity of an MP under investigation for corruption. While citizens greatly supported the dissolution (94.5% for dissolution, 44.5% turnout), MPs did subsequently not re-elect Zatlers.

While it is not clear which current and former presidents across the region will lend their support to parties future, at least one interesting case of a president-endorsed party is already on the horizon. Former Polish president Aleksander Kwaśniewski (1995-2005) is currently involved in building a coalition of left-wing parties for the 2014 European parliament elections under the name ‘Europa Plus’.

Changes to this blog: A new blog on presidents and presidential politics

presidential-power.comAfter having kept my blog www.presidentialactivism.com on presidents and politics in Central and Eastern Europe for over three years, a number of other political scientists and I have now joined forces and started a new collaborative blog on presidents and presidential politics around the world: www.presidential-power.com.

We will follow the activity of both directly elected and indirectly elected presidents; we will also post information about how presidents use their powers in different countries as well as information about events that affect presidents. I will be responsible for covering the Baltic states, Central East Europe (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), Germany, and Austria. We also have a Twitter account and Facebook page – feel free to follow/like!

I will still post links to any articles that I write for the new blog. I will also keep my Twitter account (@pres_activism) and my Facebook page (facebook.com/presidentialactivism).

Screen-Shot-2013-09-29-at-13.01.02-300x178Screen-Shot-2013-09-29-at-12.59.18-300x212

Presidential term lengths and possibilities for re-election in European republics

I recently read up on the amendments made to the Czech constitution to allow for popular presidential elections and stumbled across Art. 57 (2) – ‘No person may be elected President more than twice in succession’ (which already applied to indirectly elected presidents) and wondered how it looks in other European republics and how it relates to term length. The results of my study of each country’s constitution are summarised in the bar chart below.

While Maltese president George Abela (left) can only serve a single term of five years, Italy's Giorgio Napolitano has recently been elected for his second 7-year term and there is no term-limit |photos via wikimedia commons

While Maltese president George Abela (left) can only serve a single term of five years, Italy’s Giorgio Napolitano (right) has recently been elected for his second 7-year term and there is no term-limit |photos via wikimedia commons

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Presidents and Paupers: How much do CEE presidents earn?

– You might also be interested in my post on presidents’ salaries in Western Europe –

In times of austerity and crisis freezing or cutting public servants’ and politicians’ salaries has been a popular measure across Europe and presidents are not exempt form this trend (although they usually initiate these cuts themselves). Earlier this year, Finnish president Sauli Niinistö proposed to cut his salary by 25% and then Czech president-elect Milos Zeman announced to cut his own salary in order to lower public debt. The salary of Slovenia’s new president Borut Pahor was also cut (although not on his own initiative) so that he receives 17% less than his predecessor Danilo Türk. Unforgotten is also Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych who cut his salary in half.

gasparovic_basescuBut how much do CEE presidents actually earn? And how do their earnings relate to average income and other factors? Find answers to all these question in the figures below.

– You might also be interested in my post on presidents’ salaries in Western Europe –

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Why Eastern Europe’s politicians are all atwitter & How to ride the waves of the tweetosphere

Politics and social media; why Eastern Europe's politicians are all atwitterFollowing the great success of my rankings of tweeting presidents and prime ministers in Central and Eastern Europe last year, I have now written a new post on the topic (an updated summary if you will) for my department’s research blog. In the process of writing, I also thought a bit more about how to make waves in the ‘tweetosphere’ – read my reflections below. Continue reading

Zeman wins at home but Schwarzenberg abroad: Differences in voting results in the Czech presidential election

In the recent Czech presidential election – the first direct election of the head of state in the country’s history – it was reported that Czechs abroad predominantly voted for foreign minister and runner-up Karel Schwarzenberg instead of voting for the eventual winner, Milos Zeman. However, visualisations of this difference have been rather crude and concerned only the second round of elections on 25-26 January. For this blog post I have therefore re-worked the data from the Czech Electoral Commission website and created some new diagrams showing the patterns of this difference. In the end of this article I also provide a tentative explanation for why these differences exist.

Results of the second round of the Czech presidential elections, 25-26 January 2013 – Map from Eric Maurice (@er1cmau) Editor in chief of Presseurop.eu

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